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THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
IN MILITARY AIRCRASH CASES'
RICHARD H. JONES*
WILLIAM

E.

FINDLER**

INTRODUCTION

W

HENEVER an Air Force plane crashes, two independent

investigations are conducted simultaneously. The first,
called the Collateral Investigation,' is conducted by an officer who
takes testimony, examines evidence, including the wreckage of
the crash, and obtains laboratory analysis of any parts suspected
of being defective. He then reaches conclusions respecting the
cause of the accident. The results of this investigation are used
as a basis for disciplinary action or court suits and are available
as a matter of course under pretrial discovery procedure." The
second investigation, called the Safety Investigation," is conducted
by a board of officers who prepare a report as part of the Air
Force safety program. The report and all evidence, including witness testimony, received by the investigatory board is used solely
within the Air Force and only for the purposes of the Department's safety program.' In order to obtain maximum cooperation,
B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 1958; LL.B., American Univ., 1964.
** B.A., College of William & Mary, 1970; J.D., International School of Law,
1977.
'The discussion in this article is focused upon Air Force plane crashes and
Department of Air Force Regulations. The Departments of the Army and the
Navy have similar regulations, and the same issues are raised in any military aircraft crash. See Cooper v. Department of the Navy, 396 F. Supp. 1040 (M.D.
La. 1975), and McFadden v. Avco Corp., 278 F. Supp. 57 (M.D. Ala. 1967)
(Army aircraft crash).
SThis investigation is conducted in accordance with Air Force Regulation
(hereinafter A.F.R.) 110-14.
'See FED. R. Civ. P. 33.
4 A.F.R. 127-4.
5Id., at 5 19.
*

JOURNAL OF AIR LA W AND COMMERCE

witnesses are promised that any statements they make will not
be used in disciplinary action, civil or criminal actions, or for any
purpose other than the safety program. Thus, a representative of
the manufacturer can testify freely without fear of leaving his employer open to future civil liability.
The information revealed in these reports is unique. Only the
government has the resources and the opportunity to conduct this
type of investigation. By the time the plaintiff's attorney becomes
involved in the case, often several months or years later, many
of the facts contained in the reports are available nowhere else.
The crash site has been cleaned up and any defective parts analyzed and disposed of. Witnesses have been dispersed, and if they
can be located and deposed, their memory may have become
faulty. The testimonies of witnesses given immediately following
the accident represent "unique catalysts in the search for the truth."'
The Freedom of Information Act' provided a means by which
a plaintiff's attorney could attempt to obtain the report of the
Safety Investigation independent of pretrial discovery. Five recent
federal cases have involved military aircraft accidents in which
plaintiffs have used the Act to try to obtain this report.' They
have met with varying degrees of success, and the information
withheld has been exempted from the disclosure requirements of
the Act for a variety of reasons. This article will discuss the availability of the report under the Act, with a criticism of these recent
court decisions.
THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

The Freedom of Information Act' was enacted as part of an
effort to make government documents more easily available to the
6Southern Ry. v. Lanham, 403 F.2d 119, 128 (5th Cir. 1968), reh. denied,
408 F.2d 348 (5th Cir. 1969), cited in McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468, 474
(4th Cir. 1972). This reasoning has often been found to be sufficient to overcome the immunity from discovery accorded to an attorney's work product.
7 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). This act became effective July 4, 1967 (hereinafter
"the Act").
I Broakway v. Department of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975);
Theriault v. United States, 503 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1974), 395 F. Supp. 637 (C.D.
Cal. 1975); Rabbitt v. Department of the Air Force, 401 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y.
1974), 383 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Cooper v. Department of the Navy,
396 F. Supp. 1040 (M.D. La. 1975); Kreindler v. Department of the Navy, 372
F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
95 U.S.C. 5 552 (1970).
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general public." The Act requires federal agencies to make iden-

tifiable records kept by an agency available to any person." Although there are nine exceptions to the disclosure requirement,'
several observations lead to the conclusion that they should be
10Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).

115 U.S.C. 5 552(a)(3) (1970). In addition, S 552(a)(1) of the Act requires a federal agency to publish four classifications of documents and amendments thereto in the Federal Register. Section (a)(2) requires each agency to
make available to the public (A) final options; (B) policy statements and interpretations adopted by the agency and not published in the Federal Register; and
(C) staff manuals. The primary purpose of these sections is to prevent an accumulation of secret law, affecting the public, to which the public has no access.
5 U.S.C. 5 552(b) (1976).
(b) This section does not apply to matters that are(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an
Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense
or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to
such Executive order;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than
section 552b of this title), provided that such statute (A) requires
that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to
leave no discretion on the issue, or (B) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be
withheld;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in
litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure
of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes,
but only to the extent that the production of such records would
(A) interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive a person
of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute
an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled
by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal
investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only
by the confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and
procedures, or (F) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions;
or
(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including
maps, concerning wells.
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narrowly construed. First, the general policy of the Act is to re-

quire disclosure. The exemptions defined in the Act are meant
to be approached as exceptions to the general rule. As the Supreme
Court noted in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, "
It [the Freedom of Information Act] seeks to permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and
attempts to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure
such information from possibly unwilling official hands.

Secondly, the Act requires disclosure to "any person."1' The Freedom of Information Act eliminated "the 'properly and directly
concerned' test of who shall have access to public records, stating
that the great majority of records shall be available to 'any person'."1.. There should be no balancing of the need of the person
seeking access to the information against the requirements of
government secrecy. The Act provides for disclosure to the public,

not to the individual, and thus "any person" may obtain the information."6 Thirdly, the Act requires disclosure in all cases except
where information is specifically exempted.' The conclusion to
13410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973). See also Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425
U.S. 352 (1976); Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971).

The Act has been ranked "with the Bill of Rights as a basis for the preservation of citizen's confidence in government." Kramer & Weinberg, The Freedom of Information Act, 63 GEO. L.J. 49 (1974).
In order to provide some teeth to the requirement of disclosure, the government has been given the burden of proving that the documents requested are
within the protection of one of the specific exemptions. Campbell v. Civil Service
Commission, 539 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1976).
145 U.S.C. S 552(a)(3) (1970).
' H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
"See Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cm. L.
REv. 761, 765-66 (1967).
A necessary corollary to this principle is that the right to obtain government
documents is neither enhanced nor diminished by one's status or need for the
information. The right belongs to the public and any member of the public may
enforce the right. Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir.
1977); The Committee on Masonic Homes of the R.W. Grand Lodge v. NLRB,
414 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
175 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970): "This section [the entire Act] does not authorize
withholding of information or limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically stated ....
" (Emphasis supplied.) Professor Davis has read
this subsection to mean that a narrow interpretation should be given to each specific exemption; 'The pull of the word 'specifically' is toward emphasis on statutory language and away from all else" such as implied meanings, legislative history or judicial legislation. Davis, supra note 16, at 783. The military has not
interpreted § 552(c) in the same way. See Adams, The Freedom of Information
Act and PretrialDiscovery, 43 MIL. L. REv. 1, 8-9 (1969):
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be drawn from these three observations is that the exemptions are
to be construed narrowly and the decision should always tilt in
favor of disclosure in close cases."'
Exemption Four of the Freedom of Information Act exempts
from disclosure "trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential. 1.
There are two phrases in Exemption Four which present particular
problems with respect to military aircrash cases. The first is "commercial or financial," and the second, "from a person." The safety
investigation report can only be exempted from disclosure by
Exemption Four if it constitutes commercial or financial information received from a person outside the government.
A major controversy over Exemption Four, and the issue involved in many of the cases interpreting this exemption, is over
the type of information protected. In Barceloneta Shoe Corporav. Compton," one of the earliest cases construing the Freedom
of Information Act, the plaintiff sought access to statements made
by witnesses to investigators of the National Labor Relations
Board who were investigating alleged violations of the Labor
Management Relations Act. 1 The court found that the witness
statements were exempt from disclosure under Exemption Four
without addressing the apparent lack of commercial or financial
information. The fact that the statements were given in confidence
was enough to preclude disclosure. This is also the position taken
by the Air Force in suits brought under the Freedom of Information
The proper interpretation of subsection (f) [5 U.S.C. § 552(c)]
and the legislative history referred to would seem to be that this
subsection does have independent significance but not that attributed to it by Professor Davis. The writer suggests that subsection (f)
is telling the executive and legislative branches that if they wish
to withhold a record they must be able to fit the record within one
of the exemptions created by Congress. No new exemptions are to
be created . . . .Subsection (f) should not, however, be interpreted, as suggested by Professor Davis, as prohibiting the broad inter-

pretation of a particular exemption found in
552(b)] to produce a sound result in a particular
"Charles River Park "A," Inc. v. Department of
519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Fisher v. Renegotiation
Cir. 1972).
105 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).

(e) [5 U.S.C.
case.
Housing & Urban Dev.,
Bd., 473 F.2d 109 (D.C.

20271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967). The case was decided July 31, 1967, just

27 days after the Act became effective.
"129 U.S.C. § 141 et. seq. (1970).
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Act.2 In 'an article written by Major James W. Johnsonf of the
staff of the Judge Advocate General of the United States Air Force
for the purpose of providing "assistance to custodians of Air Force
records charged with the responsibility of responding to requests
for information [under the Act]," the author concluded that Exemption Four applies to all statements given during the course of
a safety investigation.
The view that Exemption Four applies to any confidential information finds support in both the House and Senate reports on the
bill. The House Report concluded that Exemption Four would exempt information subject to the doctor-patient or lawyer-client
privileges.' This type of information is not necessarily commercial or financial in nature. The House Report went on to state
that Exemption Four "would also include information which is
given to an agency in confidence, since a citizen must be able to
confide in his government,"" without any reference to the words
"commercial or financial" in the statute. Similarly, the Senate Report generally ignoredthese same words. Professor Kenneth Davis
of the University of Chicago Law School has pointed out that this
apparent discrepancy is explained by the fact that both reports
were based on an early version of the bill and the words "commercial or financial" were added to the statute, prior to enactment, but
after the reports were written." Although he wishes the law were
otherwise, Professor Davis concluded that "even a minimum degree
of integrity in statutory interpretation" requires that Exemption
Four be read as not exempting non-commercial and non-financial
information from disclosure."9 The vast number of cases which have
"See Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir.
1975).
3 Johnson, The Freedom of Information Act: Its Application in the Air
Force, 16 A.F.L. REV. 54 (1974).
Id. at 55.
'
2

27

H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
Id.

S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
'Davis, supra note 16, at 789-92.
29Id. at 7991. Davis believes, as does the executive branch, that any information given to the government by a citizen in confidence should be protected. In
Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the court noted that the
NLRB had recommended to Congress that the words "commercial or financial"
not be included in Exemption Four. The court refused to read these words out
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considered the question have found that Exemption Four applies

only to commercial or financial information.'
The second issue involved in considering the scope of Exemption
Four is the meaning of the phrase, "from a person." The purpose
of Exemption Four is to enable a citizen to provide certain categories of information to his government in confidence with an as-

surance that information so provided will remain confidential. In
Soucie v. David, 1 the plaintiffs brought an action to compel the
Director of the Office of Science and Technology (OST) to disclose a report prepared by the OST concerning the development
of a supersonic transport. The district court held that the report

was a presidential document and therefore exempt from disclosure. The court of appeals reversed, finding that the OST was an

agency for purposes of the Freedom of Information Act. In providing guidelines to the district court to enable it to determine if
the information sought was within Exemption Four, the court said:
"This exemption is intended to encourage individuals to provide
certain kinds of confidential information to the Government and

it must be read narrowly in accordance with that purpose."' The
of the statute and thus expand the language in a way in which Congress had
specifically considered and denied. Id. at 673 n.7.
"Continental Oil Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 519 F.2d 31 (5th Cir.
1975); National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Aug v. National
R.R. Passenger Corp., 425 F. Supp. 946 (D.D.C. 1976); Sonderegger v. Department of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 847 (D. Idaho 1976); Washington Research
Project, Inc. v. Department of Health, Education & Welfare, 366 F. Supp. 929
(D.D.C. 1973); Tax Analysts & Advocates, Inc. v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1298
(D.D.C. 1973); Wecksler v. Shultz, 324 F. Supp. 1084 (D.D.C. 1971); Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Veterans Administration, 301 F. Supp.
796 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d Cir. 1971).
The courts have found all of the following types of information to be commercial or financial information: sales and profit data, Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC,
450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971); sales statistics, inventories, expenses, profits,
gross receipts, and liabilities, National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton,
351 F. Supp. 404 (D.D.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir.
1974) contains an excellent discussion of what type of information is commercial
or financial. Among the categories of information considered to be commercial
or financial is information collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics, information provided on Small Business Administration loan applications, information
volunteered for purposes of market news services and labor and wage statistics,
and information supplied to a lender by a borrower. Id.
$' 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
2id. at 1078.
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court continued: "The exemption for confidential information is

available only with respect to information received from sources
outside the Government. '' " This same reasoning was applied in
Fisher v. Renegotiation Board.' There the court found that an

analysis of the amount of excess profits realized by a government
contractor is information prepared within the government, not
obtained from a person outside the government, and thus not
exempt from disclosure by Exemption Four.'
Major Johnson, after acknowledging that the courts have construed Exemption Four to include only information obtained from
outside the government, concluded that such an interpretation
would be disastrous to the Air Force's flight safety program, because it would mean that statements made by Air Force personnel
during the investigation would not be exempt under Exemption
Four. "It is the Air Force position that the statements of all witnesses and contracts evaluations provided to aircraft accident
boards are confidential ... ,",This position runs contrary to the

plain language of the statute, the legislative history, and the interpretation given this section by the courts.
Exemption Five to the Freedom of Information Act exempts
"inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters which would
not be available by law to a party . . . in litigation with the

agency. ' Simply stated, this exemption allows an agency to exempt
from disclosure under the Act documents not available under the
federal rules which govern pretrial discovery.' It would be nonsensical to require the government to disclose information to "any
person" which it need not disclose to a litigant who has demonstrated a need for the information. Thus, the disclosure requirements of the Act are no broader than the discovery rules, and the
33Id.
4355

at 1079 n.47.

F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1973).

331d. at 1174. Accord, Grumman Aircraft Eng'r Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd.,
425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 421 U.S. 168 (1975);
Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968), afl'd, 415 F.2d 878
(9th Cir. 1969).
Johnson, supra note 23, at 58, 59.
375 U.S.C. S 552(b)(5) (1970).
38
NLRB v.Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); EPA v.Mink, 410
U.S. 73, 85-86 (1973); Aviation Consumer Action Project v.CAB,412 F.Supp.
1028 (D.D.C. 1976).
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Act is subject to change as the scope of discovery is broadened or
narrowed by judicial decision or revision of the rules.
In Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink,"' the Supreme
Court was faced with a claim by the EPA that certain documents
were within the purview of Exemption Five. Upon discovering
that the President had ordered a report pertaining to an underground atomic explosion in Alaska, Congresswoman Patsy Mink
and thirty-two of her fellow representatives sought disclosure of
the report. When the government refused to disclose it, Mink and
her colleagues brought an action under the Freedom of Information Act to compel disclosure of the report. The court reasoned
that governmental documents not involving national security information are generally discoverable under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, and thus not exempted by Exemption Five, unless
the documents are subject to executive privilege. The court relied
heavily upon the decision rendered by Mr. Justice Reed, sitting by
designation on the Court of Claims,"0 in defining the scope of
executive privilege. The purpose of executive privilege, as viewed
by Justice Reed, is to protect the policy-making and deliberative
functions of government and to insure honest and open discussion
of ideas within the Executive Branch without fear of public disclosure. The Supreme Court therefore drew a line between "memoranda consisting only of compiled factual material or purely factual
material contained in deliberative memoranda,"' and the opinions
and recommendations of agency staffs on policy or legal matters,
and concluded that only the latter is exempted from disclosure by
Exemption Five.' Of particular interest in the context of military
aircrash cases is the court's conclusion that, "Virtually all of the
courts that have thus far applied Exemption 5 have recognized
that it requires different treatment for materials reflecting deliberative or policy-making processes on the one hand, and purely factual, investigative matters on the other." 3
The determining factor in the decision whether to exempt a
-410

U.S. 73 (1973).

40Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 939 (Ct.
Cl. 1958).
41410 U.S. 73, 87-88 (1973).
0 1d.
4
3 Id. at 89.
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given document or record from disclosure under Exemption Five
is its place in the policy-making process of the government. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit emphasized
this point in Vaughn v. Rosen:
[W]e note initially that it is not enough to assert in the context
of Exemption 5, that a document is used by a decision maker in
the determination of policy.... [T]he document must be a direct
part in the deliberative process in that it makes recommendations
or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters."
Thus, there are opinions which play no direct part in policy making and are, therefore, subject to disclosure under the Act. One
such circumstance involves the opinions of real estate appraisers
concerning the value of property. Two courts have held that such
opinions are not exempt from disclosure by Exemption Five. '
Another circumstance in which an opinion was not exempt from
disclosure by Exemption Five was involved in Moore-McCormack
Lines v. I.T.O. Corp. of Baltimore." In that case, a longshoreman
was injured while unloading a ship. The shipowner settled the
claim against itself and then brought an action for indemnity
against the stevedore. The district court ruled that a part of the
Department of Labor accident investigation report containing the
investigator's conclusions as to the cause of the accident was exempt
from disclosure by Exemption Five. Relying primarily on Mink,"'
the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court and held that the opinions and conclusions of the investigating officer were not exempt from disclosure: "Inferences about the
cause of an accident drawn from facts revealed by the investigation,
though labeled as opinions or conclusions, are not exempt under
the guise of deliberative or policy making material.""
-"523 F.2d 1136, 1143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1975); see also Aviation Consumer
Action Project v. Washburn, 535 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
"Tennessean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972);
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 343 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In the latter case, the court said: "We
hold today that the gap between suggested prices and policy recommendations
within the protection of executive privilege is unbridgeable." Id. at 1178. Cf.
Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 878
(9th Cir. 1969).
"508 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1974).
"'EPAv. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
48508 F.2d 945, 949 (4th Cir. 1974).
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Two other exemptions should be mentioned before the military
aircrash cases can be discussed. Exemption One0 exempts from
disclosure material classified in the interests of national defense.
While the Air Force may argue that the flight safety program depends on the confidentiality promised to the witnesses,"0 the government does not claim that the safety investigation reports involve
national security information. Only when the aircraft had been
carrying sensitive or classified information has the issue of national
security been raised,"' and Exemption One has not been raised as
a defense in any of the military aircrash cases brought to date.
Similarly, Exemption Three is generally not involved in military
aircrash cases. Exemption Three exempts from disclosure material
which is specifically exempted by another statute.' There is no
federal statute which exempts the report of the safety investigation
from disclosure or authorizes the Secretary of the Air Force to
exempt it. In Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration v.
Robertson," the Supreme Court held that a statute which exempted information from disclosure or gave an administrative
official discretion to exempt the material from disclosure would
satisfy the requirements of Exemption Three. Authority for promulgation of Air Force Regulations is found in two general enabling acts. ' The safety report is not "specifically exempted from
- 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970).
Affidavit of Major General T.R. McNeil, Deputy Inspector General, United
States Air Force, submitted in support of Lockheed Aircraft Corporation's Response to Plaintiffs' Request for Production of Documents, In Re Air Crash Disaster near Saigon, MISC. No. 75-0205 (D.D.C., filed August 19, 1976).
:'See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
525 U.S.C. S 552(b)(3) (1970).
50

- 422 U.S. 255 (1975). Accord, Kruh v. GSA, 421 F. Supp. 965 (E.D.N.Y.
1976). Following Robertson Congress amended Section 552(b) (3) to allow an
agency to withhold information only if the statute (A) gives the official no discretion or (B) provides specific criteria for the exercise of discretion in withholding the information. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976).
- 5 U.S.C. § 301 (1970), known as the Housekeeping statute, allows the
head of an executive or military department to prescribe regulations. Prior to
1958, this section was used by department heads as authority for withholding
information. In that year, the statute was amended adding the following language: "This section does not authorize withholding information from the public
or limiting availability of records to the public."
10 U.S.C. § 8101(f) (1970) reads: "The secretary [of the Air Force] may
prescribe regulations to carry out his functions, powers and duties under this
title." This statute neither exempts the safety report from disclosure nor gives
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disclosure" by either statute, and thus Exemption Three does
not apply to the military aircrash cases either.
MILITARY AIRCRASH CASES
There have been five recent cases which have construed the Freedom of Information Act in the context of military aircrash cases.
With one exception, the cases are not in accord with the case law
decided under Exemption Four and Five as outlined above.
The leading Freedom of Information Act case involving a mili-

tary aircrash is Brockway v. Department of the Air Force." Lieutenant David L. Brockway, Jr. was killed when his aircraft crashed
near England Air Base, Louisiana. The father of the decedent

brought an action seeking to ascertain the facts surrounding his
son's death. Specifically, the plaintiff sought the investigation conducted by the manufacturer, Cessna Aircraft Corporation, and
the Air Force Safety Investigation 'Report, including the witness

testimony. The district court, after an in camera inspection, held
that the Cessna report was exempt from disclosure under the trade
secret exemption.Y The witness statements, however, were not exempted as trade secrets, because they were obtained from persons
within the government," nor as intra-agency memoranda, because

they would be discoverable by a party in litigation with the agencyY
the Secretary the discretion to exempt it. See Administrator, Federal Aviation
Administration v. Robertson, 442 U.S. 255 (1975).
5 5 U.S.C. S 552(b) (3) (1970). Congress has specifically exempted investigations of accidents involving civil airplane accidents conducted by the National
Transportation Safety Board, 49 U.S.C. § 441(e) (1970), and reports of railroad accidents submitted to, and conducted by, the Secretary of Transportation,
45 U.S.C. § 41 (1970), from use in suits for damages arising out of the accidents. Congress has provided no such privileges for Air Force Safety Investigations.
The safety investigation report is exempted from disclosure by the terms of
A.F.R. 127-4. Agency regulations have been held not sufficient to bring government documents within the terms of Exemption Three. Freuhauf Corp. v. Internal Revenue Service, 522 F.2d 284 (6th Cir. 1975); Mobil Oil Co. v. FTC,
406 F.Supp. 305 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
-518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975).
57
Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738, 741 (N.D.
Iowa 1974).
59 Id. at 741. The court construed the phrase "from a person" in Exemption
Four to include only material received from persons outside the government.
See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also text accompanying notes 30 through 35 supra.
370 F. Supp. at 741.
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The Air Force appealed the ruling of the district court requiring
disclosure of the witness statements. The Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the witness
statements were not exempt from disclosure under Exemption Four,
basing its decision on the lack of commercial or financial information rather than on the origin of the reports within the government.
The court of appeals reversed the district court as to the question
of the intra-agency memoranda privilege, however. The court focused on three areas for support in reaching its conclusion that the
witness statements were exempt from the requirement of disclosure.
First, the court argued that while the majority of courts which have
considered the intra-agency exemption have relied on the Senate
Report' on the Act, which limits this exemption to policy-making
or deliberative material, the language of the House Report" is
broader. As support for making this distinction and for relying
on the slightly broader language of the House Report, the court
cited an administrative law treatise, published in 1970:
The exemption clearly serves that purpose [of protecting policy and
agency memoranda], but the implication that the exemption does
not go beyond that is unsound. It clearly reaches memoranda or
letters which have nothing to do with the process of arriving at
positions.'
In reaching the conclusion that non-policy matters are exempt
as intra-agency memoranda, the court ignored at least two Supreme
Court decisions which clearly so limit the exemption. In National
Labor Relations Board v. Sears Roebuck & Co.," the Court noted
that "the cases uniformly rest the privilege on the policy of protecting 'decision making processes of government agencies'..... Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink' also clearly drew the line
between those documents which are part of the policy-making process and those which are not.' Thus, while the Davis treatise may
0*S. REP.

No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).

H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
62K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 3A.21 at 157 (1970 Supp.).
- 421 U.S. 132 (1975). This case was decided approximately six weeks prior

61

to the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Brockway v. Department of the Air Force.
"Id. at 150.
"410 U.S. 73 (1973).

GaSee text accompanying notes 38-43 supra, for the discussion of EPA v.
Mink.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

have reached a perfectly valid conclusion based on the state of the
law in 1970, subsequent Supreme Court decisions have rendered it
erroneous and outdated. The court in Brockway should not have
placed such reliance on this treatise and on a slight difference in
wording between the House and Senate Reports.
As a second basis for reversing the district court in Brockway,
the Eighth Circuit relied on Machin v. Zuckert " for the proposition
that the witness statements contained in the Air Force investigation
reports are generally not available in pretrial discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. While the court in Machin withheld most of the safety investigation report from the plaintiff, it
ordered disclosure of the statements of several witnesses who testified before the Investigation Board, namely the Air Force mechanics
who examined the wreckage."8 In a supplemental order, the court in
Machin made clear that the testimony of the mechanics to be disclosed included any opinions or the conclusions they had reached
concerning the cause of the accident.' The court in Brockway
relied on Machin as authority for withholding the witness testimony
without even mentioning the fact that some of the witness testimony
was disclosed in Machin."'
As the third basis for its decision, the court in Brockway relied
on the purposes and goals of the Freedom of Information Act. The
court saw the purpose of the Act as twofold, "(1) the dissemination of useful information to the public . . .and (2) the protection from inhibition of the free flow of information and free discussion within the agency.""' The second purpose, and the one
which the court found to be thwarted by disclosure, is simply a
rephrasing of the court's initial premise, that Exemption Five is
broader than a mere exemption of policy-making memoranda. This
interpretation is simply not in accordance with recent Supreme
67316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 896 (1963).

68 1d. at 341.
69Id.

70518 F.2d at 1191-92. See also Ex Parte Turner, 57 F.R.D. 109 (S.D. Tex.
1972) (in which the court relied on Machin v. Zuckert to order disclosure of
testimony of Army investigators); McFadden v. AVCO Corp., 278 F. Supp.
(M.D. Ala. 1967) and O'Keefe v. Boeing Co., 39 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1965),
all of which are contra to the Eighth Circuit's holding in Brockway.
71 518 F.2d at 1193.
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Court interpretations of Exemption Five."
Babbitt v. Department of the Air Force"' is the second of the

recent Freedom of Information Act cases dealing with military aircrash cases. In this case, the district court reversed its earlier decision" ordering disclosure of the witness statements and held that
the witness statements were exempt from disclosure by virtue of
Exemption Five. The court relied heavily on Brockway v. Department of the Air Force' in concluding that the witness statements
and the safety report were part of the deliberative process. As pre-

viously discussed, this conclusion is not in accordance with other
decisional law under the Act.
In Theriault v. United States," the district court had ordered the

government to produce the Air Force Accident Investigation Report for inspection and copying. The government appealed, and the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the
case to the district court because that court had failed to conduct
a de novo hearing as required by the Act."" In so doing, the court
of appeals provided guidelines to the district court which stated
that traditional equity principles should be considered in determining whether material is exempt under the Act:
"See NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); EPA v. Mink,
410 U.S. 73 (1973).
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has recently construed Exemption Five narrowly, limiting it to policy-making memoranda. Relying on the principles enunciated in the two Supreme Court cases ignored by the
Eighth Circuit in Brockway, NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., and EPA v. Mink,
the court concluded,
[T]o come within the privilege and thus within Exemption 5, the
documents must be a direct part of the deliberative process in that
it makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy
matters. Put another way, pre-decisional materials are not exempt
merely because they are pre-decisional; they must also be a part of
the agency give-and-take--of the deliberative process-by which
the decision itself is made.
Vaughn v. Rosen, 523 F.2d 1136, 1143-44 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
73401 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The date given in the Federal Supplement, October 9, 1974, is obviously in error. The first decision in this case, reported at 383 F. Supp. 1065, is dated October 31, 1974. Furthermore, the court
relies heavily on Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 518 F.2d 1184 (8th
Cir. 1975), decided June 6, 1975.
11383 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
518 F.2d 1184 (8th Cir. 1975).
503 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1974).
775 U.S.C. S 552(a)(3) (1970).
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We realize that a given agency might fail to show a specific exemption protecting a given record and yet in good faith claim that
dire adverse potentialities will occur and result from a disclosure

of a given record.
The main spring of the proceedings under the Act is a judicious
weighing of the complainant's need for and entitlement to production as against the government's or another's right to protection."

On remand, the district court, employing equity principles and
a balancing of interests, held that the entire report, including the
witness statements, was exempt,"9 without any consideration of the
requirement that they must be commercial or financial information," and held that the Safety Investigation Report was exempt as
an intra-agency document."
Despite the language of the court of appeals and the holding of
the district court, the exercise of the equity powers of the court
in a suit under the Act, resulting in the withholding of information
not specifically exempted, is prohibited by the terms of the Act.
"This section [the entire Act] does not authorize withholding of
information or limit the availability of records to the public, except
as specifically stated in this section.""2 The Supreme Court has
summarized the exemptions as follows:
Subsection (b) of the Act creates nine exemptions from compelled disclosures. These exemptions are explicitly made exclusive, 5 U.S.C. § 552(c), and are plainly intended to set up concrete, workable standards for determining whether particular material may be withheld or must be disclosed."
78 503 F.2d at 392 (citations omitted).

" Theriault v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
8
"The court relied on Barceloneta Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591
(D.P.R. 1967); Brockway v. Department of the Air Force, 370 F. Supp. 738
(N.D. Iowa 1974); Machin v. Zuckert, 316 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1963); and
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), in that order.
As previously noted, Barceloneta Shoe stands alone for the proposition that
non-commercial information may be exempt under the Trade Secret exemption.
The district court in Brockway specifically held that witness statements are not
exempt under Exemption Four, and the court of appeals affirmed that ruling
precisely because the information was not commercial or financial in nature. In
Machin, a case not decided under the Freedom of Information Act, the court
allowed discovery of some of the witness statements. Reynolds deals with national defense information and executive privilege and thus has nothing to do
with the trade secret privilege under the Act.
" See text accompanying notes 59-72 supra, concerning the applicability of
Exemption Five to this report.
825 U.S.C. S 552(c) (1970).
"EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973).
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The balancing of interests between the need of the public for
disclosure and the requirements of governmental secrecy has been
done by Congress," and the courts ought not to repeat the process.
As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has concluded:
After considering voluminous testimony on both sides and balancing the public, private, and administrative interests, Congress
decided that the best course was open access to the governmental
process with a very few exceptions. It is not the province of the
courts to restrict that legislative judgment under the guise of judicially balancing the same interests that Congress has considered.'
There are two recent federal district court cases construing the
Freedom of Information Act in the context of military aircraft
accidents. In Kreindler v. Department of the Navy," the court
ruled that the witness statements were not exempt under any of the
exemptions and that the only portions of the Safety Investigation
Report exempt from disclosure were those which contained "expert
opinions, recommendations, or discussions of policy."'" This decision is in accordance with the non-military aircrash cases construing the Act, insofar as the expert opinions and recommendations deal with policy matters rather than opinions concerning
investigative facts.
Finally, in Cooper v. Department of the Navy,"' the court held
that the entire Safety Report was exempt under the Act. Unfortunately, the court did not deal with any of the problems heretofore
discussed. Specifically, the court did not consider whether the report
was "commercial or financial information" as that phrase has been
construed by the courts, or whether any of the material represented
policy-making deliberative memoranda. The court did not cite a
single case in its opinion and did not even specify which exemption
it was using as authority for exempting the material from disclosure.
"See S. REP. No. 813, supra note 60, at 3.
"Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24-25 (4th Cir. 1971). Accord, Tennesseean Newspapers, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972); Soucie v. David,
448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Robles v. EPA, 484 F.2d 843 (D.C.

Cir. 1973).
80372 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).

'7 Id. at 334.
88396 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. La. 1975).
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CONCLUSION

The Safety Investigation Report can be conveniently divided into
two parts for a proper analysis under the Freedom of Information
Act. First, there is the report of the investigators, including any
conclusions they might have reached. This document originates
within the government and therefore is not within the terms of
Exemption Four.8 Furthermore, the report does not contain "commercial or financial information" in the sense in which that phrase
has been construed under the Act."' When considered in terms of
Exemption Five the report fares no better. The factual portions of
the report are clearly not exempt from disclosure,"' and the conclusions reached by the investigators are generally "[i]nferences
drawn from facts revealed by the investigation , ' and not recommendations concerning Department of Air Force policy."
The other section of the report that is of interest is the testimony
of the witnesses given to the investigator. These witnesses can be
divided into two groups for analysis. The first group is witnesses
employed by the government. This group would include the experts who examined the wreckage and any survivors among the
crew members. This testimony suffers from the same infirmities
as the report of the investigators discussed above. Simply stated,
it is non-commercial, non-financial information which originates
within the government and which does not deal with agency policy.
Thus it is not exempt under either Exemptions Four or Five. Testimony given by non-government employed witnesses has a greater
claim to exemption from disclosure under the Trade Secret Exemption, " being information received by the government from a citizen
895 U.S.C. § 552(b) (4) (1970). 'This section does not apply to matters that
are trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential."
See, e.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Fisher v. Re-

negotiation Board, 355 F. Supp. 1171 (D.D.C. 1973).

"0See text accompanying note 28 supra.
"EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
02
Moore-McCormack Lines v. ITO Corp. of Baltimore, 508 F.2d 945, 949
(4th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 37-46 supra.
0' To the extent that these reports do contain genuine policy recommendations,
the attorney for the prospective plaintiff in a personal injury or wrongful death
action is probably not concerned with it. His immediate interest is in the facts of
the accident and the conclusions of the investigator concerning the cause of the
accident in which his client was injured.
-5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1970).
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in confidence. However, as this information will generally fail to
be commercial or financial information as that phrase has been
construed, it will not be exempt.
One can only speculate as to the reason for this discrepancy between the decisional law under the Act in military aircrash cases
on the one hand and in other types of cases on the other. As yet
no United States Supreme Court case has resolved this conflict.
Almost as important, there has been no decision by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit on the issue. The
District of Columbia Circuit has produced many of the key decisions under the Act' and a decision from that court would, it is
submitted, go a long way toward bringing the military aircrash
cases into line with other decisions under the Act."

9E.g., Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). See also Kramer
& Weinberg, supra note 13.
" Kreindler v. Department of the Navy, 372 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
is the one military air crash case in accord with the other cases decided under the
Act. See text accompanying notes 86-87 supra.

